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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
European Economic Community Commission Vice-President Sicco
Mansholt hailed December 15, 196b, the day on which the six Common
Market countries agreed on a single grain price, as "the day of triumph
for Europe." He termed it, "a milestone in the history of the Common
Agricultural Policy" of the European Economic Community (hereinafter
referred to as the EEC). EEC Commission President Walter Hallstein
said, "This success cannot be overemphasized. "'•
This agreement marks the first time that a group of nations have
combined their national agricultural policies under a single common
price system. There have been many opinions voiced in Germany both for
and against this decision. Many would definitely not call it a day of
triumph for West German agriculture.
For the Federal Republic of West Germany, the application of the
EEC common grain price system will bring to an end an era of national
control of policies for grains. On July 1, 1967, the present higher
protected price of wheat in Germany will drop to a lower common price
for all EEC countries. (Italy and Luxembourg will also experience a
price decline while France will have an increase in the wheat price.
Belgium and the Netherlands will remain about the same.) 2 Since wheat
"Community Adopts Common Grain Price " European Community.
No. 77 (January, 1965), pp. 6-7.
2
All references to wheat in this report mean soft wheat unless
stated otherwise.
2production makes up a major portion of the German grain production, this
change will be of great significance to most German farmers.
The price of wheat holds a key position in the pricing structure
of German agriculture. Therefore any change in its price brings about
related changes and problems. This report will try to analyze what the
implementation of the common price for wheat as a part of the EBC Common
Agricultural Policy will mean to West German agriculture.
The continuing development of the Common Agricultural Policy of
the Common Market increasingly affects Germany's agricultural policies.
Some ninety per cent of West Germany's domestic farm output is now sub-
ject to the supranational jurisdiction of the EEC. Nevertheless, the
Common Agricultural Policy currently permits substantial flexibility in
national programs. How Germany's agricultural policies are changing
with reference to wheat will be discussed in this report.
In order to understand the implications involved in this change
of the wheat price, it is necessary to review the background structure
of policies and conditions that have brought about the present situation
in German wheat production. Next it will be shown how the present and
future policies for wheat are being developed and carried out within the
EEC structure. Then with an understanding of the aims and objectives
of both West Germany and the EEC it ia possible to analyze what changes
are occurring presently in Germany. The role of interest groups and
how they peek to influence the decision making bodies will also be dis-
cussed. By seeing why certain problems arise it can be better understood
what the effects of the EEC common wheat price to Germany will be.
CHAPTER II
IMPORTANCE OF WHEAT
Wheat holds an important position in the structure of both EEC
and German agricultural production. Almost one half of the grain pro-
duced in the Common Market is wheat. Grain production of the EEC ac-
counts for fourteen per cent of the cash receipts of agriculture.
^
Wheat production in Germany has increased both absolutely and rela-
tively over the past several years and in I96I4 it accounted for 31.5
per cent of the total volume of grain production,'1
In 1967 the price ratio between wheat and feed grains will ap-
proximate 11^:100. The Drice of wheat can be said to be a basic corner-
stone in the agricultural pricing structure of the EEC. Because of the
interrelationship of grain prices with the prices of other agricultural
products, grain prices determine the general price level to a great ex-
tent. Feed grain prices are decisive in determining the price of all
animal products in which grain is the principal cost factor.
^
3
Henry Junckerstorff (ed.), International Manual on the European
Economic Community (St. Louis: Saint Louis University Press, 1963),
p. 280.
U. S. Department of Agriculture, The 196$ Western Europe
Agriculture Situation
, Economic Research Service, Foreign No. llli
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, February, 1965), p. 73.
5Junckerstorff, p. 357.
3
hOne estimate is that the price of grain determines the price
formation of about 75 per cent of all sales of agricultural products
in the EEC. Thus it is justifiable economically that the discussion
on the common agricultural market price level has concentrated on the
key position in the price structure, that of grains and -wheat in par-
ticular.
Wheat production in Germany requires the most complete arid com-
plicated syptem of market management. This is attributable to its posi-
tion in the agricultural structure.
6
Ibid., p. 358,
CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF CURRENT GERMAN WHEAT PRODUCTION STRUCTURE
Review of Policy Aims to Present Time
Policies concerning wheat production in Germany have gone through
some drastic changes in the past century. Roughly 100 years ago, Germany
pursued a free trade policy under which agriculture enjoyed growing
prosperity. Since that time agriculture in Germany has been losing out
to industry and overseas countries. The long term trend of increasing
aid has placed the West German wheat producer as one of the most protected
individuals in the world economically speaking. A highly protective and
subsidized agriculture has developed with a network of price supports,
import controls, direct subsidies, and development programs that now
surrounds th^ wheat producer.
The main objective immediately after World War II was to encourage
German farmers to produce as much wheat as possible to fill the needs of
West Germany. One argument heard was that a large supply of home produced
foodstuffs was needed as mandatory insurance against further severe short-
ages due to war conflicts. In 1950 wheat marketing laws were passed and
imparts were restricted to promote domestic production at a high price
level. As a result, wheat production is presently found on most farms
that have suitable ground and climatic conditions.
5
6Brief mention should be made here as to the diversification of
German farms. Most farms produce a variety of grains and field crops
along with several different livestock enterprises. Although some farms
emphasize one enterprise, several others will be followed in a limited
extent. In the case of wheat production there are practically no com-
pletely specialized wheat producers. This lack of specialization is
partly a result of natural climatic conditions and plant diseases and
oartly due to past tradition.
In recent years the emphasis in wheat policies has shifted from
increasing output to increasing incomes of farmers. One of the basic
objectives of agricultural policy, as set out in the Agricultural Act
of 1955, is that agriculture should share in the progressive develop-
ment of the economy. Obtaining approximate parity of agricultural in-
comes with other sectors of the economy has been the chief aim. This
Act requires the federal government to submit annually to the Parliament
a "Report on the Agricultural Situation" usually called the "Green Re-
port." After evaluation of the "Green Report" the Federal Government
submits a "Green Plan" which indicates measures taken or envisaged on
a federal level to improve the economic situation of agriculture.
7
The first "Green Plans" were designed to improve the economic
position in the short run. In 1956/57 fertilizer subsidies were intro-
duced to diminish the purchase price of fertilizer by about twenty per
cent. These were abolished in 1963 due to EEC regulations and as a
7Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Fifth Report on
Agricultural Policies in Europe and North America
. A Report Prepared
by the Ministerial Committee for Agriculture and Food (July, 196l), p. 157,
7result orices rose about ten per cent.^ Also since 1956 the price of
diesel oil used for agricultural purposes has been reduced as part of
the "Green Plan." For example in i960 farmers paid only 56 per cent
as much for diesel oil as other consumers did." Freight subsidies for
domestic wheat shipments also raised the price for farmers in outlying
regions. Since 1957, aid to construction of grain storage and grain
drying facilities has been included among "Green Plan" measures.
More recently emphasis has shifted towards the improvement of
the structure of the agricultural economy. In I96I1, three-fifths of
the agricultural budget of $l,0b6 million was allocated through the
"Green Plan." About half of this allocation was for structural programs. 10
These included land consolidation projects, relocation of farmsteads from
villages to the country, better farm roads, drainage systems, and various
regional development programs. Many of these projects were financed
fifty per cent by the government and fifty per cent by the farmers them-
selves through low interest loans.
From these examples of the historical process of policy develop-
ment it can be seen that the price of wheat is but one part of a vast
complex program designed to promote income parity and efficiency in
production. As far as wheat production is concerned the policies have
shown that the economic answer is nearly irrelevant. Wheat policies
Q
U. S. Department of Agriculture, The 1965 Western Europe
Agriculture Situation
, p. 3k.
9
Organization for European Economic Cooperation, p. 165.
TJ. S. Department of Agriculture, The 1965 Western Europe
Agriculture Situation
, p. 35.
8have mainly played a regulative role. The height of the German grain
price is not then solely based on fixed economic criteria. The income
of a farmer producing wheat has not been solely dictated by the price
he received for the wheat when sold. 11
Structural Problems
A complex structural problem has developed in Germany due to the
results of World War II and inheritance customs. The severance of the
mainly agricultural regions of East and Central Germany as a consequence
of World War II meant the loss of many large efficient wheat growing
farms. 12 In Southern and Western Germany fragmentation and scattering
of farmland through inheritance have helped reduce the average farm size.
As a result the Federal Republic of West Germany found itself in
1963 with over seventy per cent of its 1.5 million farms below ten
hectares1-' in size. On the average each farm contains 9.6 separate
plots of land. 11* Present efforts to mechanize and improve the efficiency
of wheat production have met with serious problems. The large amounts
of capital necessary are not economically feasible with the small average
11
Werner Schwarz, "Die deutsche Agrarpolitik im Ubergang zum
Gemeinsamen Market," Flugschriften der Deutschen Landwirtschafts -
Gesellschaft, Band 3b (Frankfurt am Main: DIG - Verlag, 1963), p. 2li.
Gunther Behrendt, "The Agrarian Problem in the Federal Republic
of Germany," The German Economic Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (196M, p. 111.
^One hectare equals 2.U7 acres.
*%. S. Department of Agriculture, The 1965 Western Europe
Agriculture Situation
, p. 3k.
9size of the farms. Effective use of machinery is limited by the scat-
tered plots and the hilly terrain found in some areas.
The many problems now facing German agriculture are really an
inheritance from the past. The small size of many German farms has
definitely limited their income potential. In a speech Dr. Hallstein
termed the two main problems of today's agricultural policies as the
deficiency of agricultural income and an equalization of production and
market demands for the individual commodities. J
In 1962/63 sixty-five per cent of the domestic consumption of
wheat in Germany was covered by domestic production. Germany has the
largest wheat deficit of any of the EEC countries. 1° Soft wheat needs
are in fact almost totally met for the EEC. In 1962/63 there was a
small surplus of production. The main need for imports is for durum
wheat and high quality milling wheat.
The possibility of over production of wheat is a very real
problem. The existence of 1.6 to 2 million hectares of reserve land
in France that could be brought into wheat production if the price is
high enough bears this out.-1-'''
1<
Walter Hallstein, "Die Landwirtschaft in der Grossraumwirtschaft,"
Flugschriften der Deutschen Landwirtschafts - Gesellschaft, Band 3h
(Frankfurt am Main: DLG - Verlag, 1963), p. 7.
Bundesministerium fur Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten,
"ein Hof Me in Markt, Land- und Hauswirtschaftlicher Auswertungs und
Informationsdienst, Nr. 233 (Bonn, I96I4), p. $.
17
-"-'"The Mansholt Plan and What it Means," Common Market
,
Vol. h, No. 1 (January, 196U), p. 6.
10
Import and Storage Agency and Milling Requirements
The Import and Storage Agencies (Einfuhr und Vorratsstellen)
play a large role in the German wheat market. The main task of this
state trading agency is to influence prices on the domestic market by
controlling imports and by operating a stockpiling scheme.
The following is a description of the activities of the Import
and Storage Agencies prior to July 30, 1962 when the first EFC grain
regulatory policies went into effect. At that time German domestic
wheat production was kept competitive by a system of import levies or
price equalization fees.
Imoorters of wheat into Germany concluded contracts with the
Agency whereby the Agency bought the wheat to be imported at the world
price and then resold it to the German importer at a fixed internal
price level. i0 The difference, known as a skimming charge (Abschopfung),
was pocketed by the government. The skimming charge or price equali-
zation fee was kept at a high enough level to equalize the price of
imported wheat with that of domestic wheat. Quotas and licensing of
imports were also handled by the Agency.
In Germany before 1962 according to the 1950 grain marketing law,
a marketing board (the Import and Storage Agencies) established fixed
floor and ceiling prices annually for all locally produced wheat. These
maximum and minimum producer prices were fixed in four separate regions
18
United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, National
Grain Folic ies (Rome, 19^9), p. 20.
11
related to location of milling facilities and transportation costs from
surplus to deficit areas.
^
In each region it was attempted to keep the producer price for
wheat fairly even regardless of the local market situation. If farmers
were unable to obtain the guaranteed minimum price on the open market,
freight subsidies were used to ship wheat to other markets. When this
could no longer hold the price in line, the Import and Storage Agency
would purchase wheat on the open market at the minimum price. Cor-
respondingly they were obliged to sell from their stocks of wheat when-
ever the market price rose above the fixed maximum.
Another policy started in l$>5it, which helped secure a market
for domestic wheat production, was concerned with German wheat millers.
They were regulated by law as to the minimum proportion of domestic
wheat and the maximum proportion of foreign quality wheat that they
could utilize in their milling operations. In 1961/62 these percentages
were 75 and 23. The millers were thus forced to pay high prices for
domestic wheat rather than use cheaper imported quality wheat. The EEC
required that this practice be dropped in July, 1962.
In 1959/60 premiums were started for certain wheat varieties of
high baking quality. These premiums have varied from five to thirty
19Leo J. Schaben, Impact of Common Market Proposals on Competitive
Status of U. S^ Bread and Feed Grains in the EEC Area
,
0*. s7~Department
of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, U - 123 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, October, 196l), p. 17.
20 .
United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization.
12
Deutsche Mark (DM) per ton2^ and were paid only if production of the
varieties had been contracted for in advance. The share of these
22
varieties in total wheat production has been quite small.
Since the application of the first EEC grain policies in 1962,
the functions of the Im-ort and Storage Agency have changed somewhat.
The Agency is being integrated into the EEC structure. Import quotas
and licensing of imports have been dropped. The old skimming charge
has been replaced by the EEC variable import levy.
Review of Prices
During the first few years after World War II wheat prices were
fixed at relatively low levels in Germany. Before 1950 there was com-
paratively little difference between the producer price for wheat in all
the EEC member countries. Prices in the Netherlands, France and Germany
were all between 250 DM and 300 DM per ton. Italy was far above at UltO DM
23
per ton.
These low wheat prices, which were below the world market prices,
could not be maintained by Germany. The high cost of subsidies required
to purchase wheat imports, an unfavorable balance of payments, the danger
of cheap wheat being fed to livestock, and increasing production costs
21
All references to Deutsche Mark use the current exchange rate
of four Deutsche Mark equal one dollar. All references to tons are to
metric tons. One metric ton equals 2,200 pounds.
22
Karen J. Friedmann, "German Grain Policies and Prices: 1925-
196b," Food Research Institute Studies, Vol. V, No. 1 (Stanford Uni-
versity, 1965), p. h8.
23
Junckerstorff, p. 359.
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were reasons for the government to Increase the price of wheat in both
1950 and 1951. 2li
From Table 1 it can be seen that wheat prices in Germany have been
fairly stable since 1951-52. Up to the present, producer prices have re-
mained unchanged under EEC regulation. With slightly declining world wheat
prices since 1950, German producers have enjoyed increasing protection.
TABLE 1.—Average prices of wheat to German
producers 191*8-61*.
Year Deutsche Mark per ton
191*8-1*9 266
19l*9-5o 269
1950-51 351
1951-52 I1U0
1952-53 1*31
1953-51 1*27
19514-55 1*25
1955-56 1*25
1956-57 1*25
1957-58 !,la
1953-59 1*1*2
1959-60 1*1*2
1960-61 I4I40
1961-62 t*l*o
1962-63 1*1*2
1963-61* 1*39
Source: Karen J. Friedmann "German Grain
Policies and Prices, 1925-61*"
Food Research Institute Studies
,
Vol. V, No. 1 (Stanford University,
1965), p. 97.
21*
United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, p. 20.
CHAPTER IV
REVIEW OF STRUCTURE IN EEC GRAIN POLICY FORMATION
Since the signing of the Rome Treaty in 1957, there has been
developing a supranational organization for the control of wheat
policies in Germany and the other EEC countries. Germany is re-
linquishing her national control to the governing bodies of the EEC
whose institutions were set up at the beginning of l°lj8. The important
decisions on German wheat policies, such as the adoption of the Mansholt
Plan, are now being made by the EEC Commission and Council of Ministers.
The nine members of the Common Market Commission have the task
of formulating proposals for the control of wheat as well as many other
agricultural and non-agricultural policies. The Mansholt 3lan for the
establishment of a common price level for grains, for example, was
drafted in November of 1963 by the Commission. After the Commission
proposals are approved by the Council, the Commission has the execu-
tive duty of carrying them out.
The policy making body of the EEC is the Council of Ministers.
It is the only Community institution whose members are national repre-
sentatives. A member of each of the six national governments sits on
the Council. For most majority decisions, votes are weighted with France,
Germany, and Italy having each four votes, Belgium and the Netherlands
111
IS
two each, and Luxembourg one. ** It was their approval of the Mansholt
Plan on December 15, 19614 that will now allow a common price for wheat
to be applied in the six member countries no later than July 1, 1967.
The lh2 man EEC Parliament i9 generally consulted by the Council
before major decisions are made, but its powers are mainly limited to
scrutinizing the Community^ budget.
Even though Germany has her own national representative on the
Council, she no longer has sole control over her domestic wheat policies.
Any actions taken by her must stay within the limits prescribed by the
EEC. Presently she does have a veto vote in the EEC Council of Minis-
ters, but after June 30, 1967 a qualified majority will rule.
Management committees have been established by the EEC for grains
and several other agricultural products. These consist of national
experts from the member countries and are presided over by a member of
the Commission who has no vote. Their function is to gather and com-
pile the information and data necessary and to advise the Commission in
these areas. Through the grain committee Germany has opportunity to
voice her opinion on wheat policies.
In view of the divergent policies and programs adopted by the
member countries for the solution of their wheat and grain marketing
problems, it was impossible to adopt any one of them for application
^European Community Information Service, The Facts (Brussels:
E.G.I. , September, 1962), p. 7.
Alan Campbell and Dennis Thompson, Common Market Law (London;
Stevens and Sons, 1962), p. UJU5.
16
to the Community as a whole. Therefore the existing national marketing
or regulatory agencies (such as Germany's Import and Storage Agencies)
will be co-ordinated and integrated into a Common Market system to be
operated by the European Grain Office under the control of the Commission,
Presently the Import and Storage Agencies in Germany are administering
the EEC directives at the local intervention and importation points.
CHAPTER V
EEC OBJECTIVES OF WHEAT CONTROL POLICIES
The Rome Treaty contains the basic aims of agricultural policies
that have served as ?oals in the recent wheat policy decisions. These
guidelines are increased productivity, attainment of a fair or adequate
standard of living for farmers, and guaranteed supplies to consumer at
reasonable prices. 2 7
More specifically the EEC objectives with respect to wheat have
been the establishment of a single domestic market for all the member
countries. Guidance for the production of wheat in the light of in-
ternal and external requirements is another. 28 Stabilisation of market
prices is also an objective along with protection of domestic wheat
production against outside sources of supply.
The director of the agricultural markets sector of the EEC Com-
mission stated in a speech, "It can not be strongly enough said that the
Community wants to follow an agricultural policy that will permit im-
porters of foodstuffs from third countries their fair share of the
market.
»
2
- Sicco Mansholt was never in favor of setting the grain price
'MlohMl Shanks and John Lambert, The Common Market Today - AndTomorrow (New York: 7rederick A. Praeger, T962), p. B7:
^
Leo J. Schaben, p. 21.
w^tcw?* HeI\inga£ ^ie Getreidemarktregelung in der Europa'ischen
?££?XSlSre±TChfY SpeeC !? Riven at a raeeti"g of the Verein derOetreidehf ndler der Hamburger Borse e.V., March 16, 1962, p. 6.
18
so high that EEC grain production would become self-sufficient and
cause an end to imports. The EEC professes to have no desire to
isolate the agriculture of the six from the rest of the world and
will allow the importation of some wheat to continue.
Overproduction of soft wheat is a problem that the EEC desires
to avoid. The presence of 1.6 to 2.0 million hectares of reserve farm-
land in France, that can be brought into soft wheat production if the
price is high enough, has exerted a downward pressure on the Common
Market wheat price. On the other hand increased production of quality-
hard wheats is welcomed.
The attainment of a common price level for grains was seen by
the EEC as a necessary element to permit them to carry on meaningful
trade negotations at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
meetings in Geneva. It is essential that the EEC offer to foreign
countries common trade policies based on established wheat policies
rather than desired ones.
In trying to achieve these objectives the EEC has encountered
many obstacles. It is extremely difficult to formulate a common wheat
price for six countries which possess widely varying characteristics
due to their recent development. Efficiency of production varies from
some of the small fragmented farms of Germany and Italy to the more
"Sicco Mansholt Speaks on the Common Market," Foreign Agri-
culture, Vol. I, No. 16 (April 22, 19631, p. h,
'
31
Exekutivsekretariat der Kommission der Europaischen
Wirtsehaftsgemeinschaft, Sonderbeilage zum Bulletin der
Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (Nr. 12, 1963), p. I4.
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efficient, larger farms found in France and the Netherlands. Technical
progress has been much greater in some areas than others. One of the
causes of these wide variations is the diversity of natural conditions
(soil, water supply, altitude, and temperature).
Of substantial importance in the price harmonization effort is
the need to equalize the transportation costs for wheat among the Com-
munity members. In a speech by Belgian Agricultural Minister Boreribond
this is brought out. "Market organization is more than just setting a
price. It includes the development of normal competitive conditions
between EEC countries."-^2 Unequal freight rates are a distortion to
normal competitive conditions. Also to be included are differing tax
structures and variances in state subsidization payments to wheat pro-
duction.
Quality standards for wheat had to be agreed upon. Application
of EEC wheat standards in Germany in I963/6I1 brought about a slight
decrease in the price of wheat which was strongly opposed by Oermany.
Agreement on units of measurement for quantity and value has also caused
some minor disagreements among EEC countries.
32Europa Land - und Ernahrungswirtschaft Nachrichten aus
_
- OECD - EFTA
,
No. 109 (Frankfurt am Main: Vereinigte
Wirtschaftsdienste GMBH, May 29, I96I4 ), p. 2.
CHAPTER VI
VIEWS OF INFLUENCING GROUPS
West German Government
The West German government has found itself in a very precarious
position in the past several years with regards to the Mansholt Plan and
the lowering of grain prices in Germany. They were pressured from all
sides by groups desiring certain objectives. With national elections
coming up in 1965, opinions were definitely affected by political aims.
The strategy finally employed by Chancellor Erhard was to delay
acceptance of the Mansholt Plan as long as possible and continually push
for more concessions. When Germany finally accepted the common grain
policy in December of 19614, it closed a long and unsettled chapter in
the development of wheat policies in Germany.
During the past several years the basic criticisms of the
Mansholt Plan by the German government and Minister of Agriculture
Schwarz have been on the following points. The indecision as to the
future financing of the common agricultural policy gave Germany fears
that because she was a major importing country she would have to con-
tribute a major share through the variable import levy. Most members
of the government reasoned that the EEC compensatory payments to German
20
21
farmers for loss of income due to the lower grain prices were not
adequate,
"
The German government worked for a harmonization of the freight
rates in the EEC for grain. The differences in labor costs and other
factors ought to be brought in line. Also tax and trade policies should
be agreed upon. The government pushed for and obtained a revision clause
in the common grain price agreement.
In March, 1961t when Chancellor Erhard declined to accept the
Mansholt plan, he stated, "The present German grain price is not too
high when one considers the production and cost relationships. The
government will always be conscious of their responsibility and duty
towards the German farmers." At about this same time the German
government stated a list of objections to the Mansholt Plan which
included most of the above criticisms.
The problem of the German farmers being squeezed between rising
costs and constant grain prices during the past fourteen years has been
a sore ooint for farmers and the government alike. However, many knew
and saw that a change in the German whpat and grain prices was inevitable.
For example, Professor Doctor Heinrich Niehaus of Bonn stated, "There
•it
comes a time when the Germans must make concessions.
"
J?
33Pie Welt (Hamburg), March 2b, I96I4, p. 1.
3^Ibid
., March 19, 1961i, p. 1.
Heinrich Niehaus, "Agrarpolitik zwishen Wunschbild und
Wirklichkeit," Agri Forum , Heft 5, May I96I1, p. ?.
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The German government realized that the grain price question was
the key price that was holding back the whole common agricultural policy
of the EEC. Also they saw that without common EEC grain policies the
Common Market was peverely handicapped in the present Kennedy Round of
the GATT tariff negotiations. These and other pressures helped bring
the German government to accept the EEC common grain policy in December
of I96I4.
Farm Interest Groups in West Germany
Probably the most highly organized sector of the German economy
is agriculture. Most farmers are members of associations which are
united in a central coalition. This agricultural block or "green front"
as it is called in Germany, is often engaged in politics and has a
strong voice in government.
Over thirty members of the Christian Democratic party in the late
1950* s in the German Parliament were officials of agricultural interest
groups. 3° The other smaller political parties also have many agricultural
representatives. Also the presidents of many state agricultural associ-
ations are members of the state governments.
The agricultural interest groups in Germany hold the opinion that
the Minister of Agriculture should have their confidence and defend their
interests as a kind of pressure group within the administration. This
brings strong criticism from other groups who believe civil servants
Henry W. Ehrmann (ed. ), Interest Groups on Four Continents
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), p. 110.
23
should be neutral.37 Minister of Agriculture Schwarz has definitely
been against any wheat and grain price declines and income losses due
to the EEC.
The success of the political skills of these farm interest groups
in Germany is evidenced by the present structure of their agriculture.
The wheat producer is surrounded with an extremely high degree of pro-
tection in comparison with other sectors of the German economy. As a
chief example of the success of these groups, the German government is
committed by law to take no measures that would reduce farm incomes.
The main voice of the German farm groups is the Central Committee
for German Agriculture (Zentral-ausschuss der Deutschen Landwirtschaft )
.
It was formed in 19h9 by the German Farmers' Union (Deutscher Bauernverband),
the Federation of Rural Co-operatives (Deutscher Raiffeisenverband), the
German Agricultural Society (Verband der Deutschen Landwirtschafts-
Gesellschaft), and the Federation of Chambers of Agriculture (Verband
der Deutschen Landwirtschaftskammern).™
The members of the Central Committee represent the four strongest
farm interest groups in Germany. The function of the Central Committee
is to find a uniform approach to fundamental matters in which these
associations have a common interest. The diversity of the organizations
that belong to the Central Committee reflect the many kinds of farm
37Ibld., p. 112.
^Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry, Bonn,
Agricultural Organizations of the_ German Federal Republic , Agriculture
and Home Economics Evaluation and Information Service (Neuwied/Rhein:
Raiffeisendruckeri GM3H, 1958), p. 29.
2k
enterprises. This diversity coupled with a close co-operation between
the various organizations guarantees a strong representation for agri-
culture.
The German Farmers' Union is a voluntary union of fifteen state
associations. Over a million farms, more than half of all agricultural
holdings, belong to the state associations. They have no political or
religious connections.
It has been one of the main tasks of the Farmers' Union to in-
fluence the preparation and implementation of the "Green Plans" actively
through proposals and suggestions. They emphasize it is of vital im-
portance in contemplating a decline in the grain prices, not to forget
the Agricultural Law of 195? and for what it stands.39 The Farmers'
Union was an instigator of the fair share of income or parity of income
aim for agriculture as expressed in the 195$ law. They have also argued
strongly against a decrease in the wheat and grain prices because one
of the aims of the EEC Treaty is to develop farm incomes.
The following excerpt from a speech by one of the presidents of
the Farmers' Union, Edmund Rehwinkel, gives the position of the organi-
zation. "As representatives of the German Farmers' Union, we have tried
to defend the German price levels, which we definitely know are too low
in order to provide a normal standard of living in our own economy."^
39Ibid., p. 1?.
liO
Edmund Rehwinkel, "Die Agrarpolitischen Probleme in der
Gegenwart," Speeches given at four Landvolkkundgebungen, July, 1962,
P. 2li,
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The Farmers' Union ia strongly against the lowering of agricultural
prices in Germany and especially those of grains. Reasons given are that
any excess production of wheat in the EEC would never be a problem like
that of the United States since the EEC has almost as many people and
only one-sixth as much fprm land. Also, losses from grain production
can not be made up by increasing livestock production. German agri-
culture simply can not stand for any lowering of product prices because
they are pressured enough by increasing wages and farm costs.
^
1
In Germany considerable importance is attached to the co-operative
system. It gives the small farmers more marketing strength. The central
organ of the co-operatives is the Federation of German Rural Co-oppratives
which embraces most credit, community, farm, and central co-operatives.^2
The importance of the rural co-operatives is shown by a membership of
3.7 million in 22,7lO co-operatives at the end of 1957.
The co-operatives seek to exert as much force in Bonn as pos-
sible. A former Minister of Agriculture was recently President of the
Central Co-operative Federation.
The German Agricultural Society was founded for different pur-
poses than the other groups. It is their principle not to engage in
politics, but to devote itself to the technical development of agri-
culture. Its only tasks are those which are not or only incompletely
Ibid
., p. 20.
Junckerstorff, p. 322.
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handled by existing associations. ^3
They are a very progressive group that led the way in introducing
seed certifications and variety experiments. They rely on political
neutrality and strive to keep their members well informed on the grain
price question by bringing in noted speakers to present all sides.
The Federation of Chambers of Agriculture is an autonomous organi-
zation of agriculture under public law. Their main tasks consist in
promoting all branches of agricultural production and in aiding legis-
lation, administration, and jurisdiction with expert advice. ku
They maintain a farm management section and provide a large
number of statistics to the federal government. Improvement of quality
and standardization of farm products has been one of their aims. Their
voice in Bonn has not been nearly so strong as the Farmers' Union.
All these groups hold annual gatherings of some type which give
farmers and farm leaders opportunities to express their opinions on
wheat policies. Newspapers and copies of speeches are printed and
widely distributed by these groups in order to present their views.
Thnugh pressures on the Bonn government and talks with Germany's
leaders, these groups have tried to present the plight of the cost price
squeeze of German wheat producers. They have suggested that the EEC
use the full transition period until 1970 to equalize the grain prices.
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Forestry, Bonn,
Agricultural Organizations
. . , p. 27»
Ibid., p. 2l.
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They were in hopes that inflationary pressures in other EEC countries
would force the wheat and other grain prices up to the German levels.
They reason that with the present unjust relationships between prices
and costs, German agriculture will be severely hurt by the lowered
grain prices.
Farmers as a whole in Germany support and take an active interest
in their organizations. They have voiced their opinions and exerted
pressures in many ways in opposition to the coming drop in wheat and
other Rrain prices in 1967.
An example of the farmers' resistance was given one day in
Gottingen, Germany in 19&2. Three professors, who had published a
report on the results of a grain price reduction, were meeting at the
university. Several thousand farmers in the area turned out to protest,
many of them driving into town on their tractors. The report had pre-
dicted a drop of about one million farm workers in Germany in the next
fifteen years.
One other very powerful interest group in Germany is the Catholic
Church. About one-half of the people of Germany are C?tholic and many
government officials are Catholic. The church pancall on the Catholic
citizens, especially in rural areas, to get out and vote and support
certain measures. The church can apply pressure at various points in
the government.
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Non-farm Interest Groups in West Germany
Within Germany many non-farm interest groups feel that in some
way the decision on the common grain price will affect them. Most
wanted to see the common price levels established as soon as possible
and not too high. They feared that any move towards an isolated, pro-
tected agricultural market would lead to severe repercussions on trade
and exports in other sectors of the German economy.
For example, some of the labor unions were in favor of the
Mansholt Plan as an entrance point to the general unification of all
agricultural prices. They feared that a higher price would lead to
large surpluses of grains."^ a group of grain Importers and co-
operatives in Nordrhein-Westfalen held that the equalization of the
grain prices was indispensable as far as the grain trade was concerned.
The manager of a German industry and trade group reasoned that
the Federal Republic of West Germany should accept lower grain prices
so that she could work towards strengthening the trade ties between the
United States and Western Europe in the Kennedy Round. Professor
Doctor Ing. Carl Fohl in Berlin presented another view from the business
viewpoint. The common grain price cannot be held at the present level
in Germany as this would lead to strong expansion of wheat production
in other EEC lands. On the other hand the price drop should not be
sudden as this would mean a hard blow to German agriculture. "The
farmers should see that the high grain prices are a two-sided sword
h5 "
Europa Land - und Ernahrungswirt scha ft Nachrichten
. .
,
No. 121, June 15, 196b, p. 2.
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and that their situation can become worse rather than better. A gentle
change to lower prices that would develop a healthy, sound agricultural
structure is desirable.''^
Not all non-farm groups wanted to accept the Mansholt Plan's
lower grain prices. Some felt that the EEC should be more understanding
of Germany's problems and increase the compensation payments to German
farmers. The Central Association of German Grain, Feed and Fertilizer
Dealers hoped for an acceptable solution that would keep German grain
production capable and strong.
Governments of Other EEC Members
During the past year, Germany was not the only member that voiced
some objections to the Mansholt Plan. Italy was most unhappy with the
price relationship among grains. Their agricultural minister, Ferrai-
Aggradi felt that the set price for soft wheat was too low and that the
difference between it and hard wheat was not enough. Also he reasoned
that the feed grain prices were too high and that the transition period
should not be shortened .^7
The French position as voiced by General De Gaulle and Minister
of Agriculture Pisani showed they had objections to the regionalization
of their grain prices as the Mansholt Plan called for. Although a quick
rise in the French grain prices would meet the demands of some French
Ibid., No. 119, June 11, 196U, p. 7.
1 n
Agra Europe (Bad Godesberg: Agra - Europe, Presse- und
Informationsdienst GMBH, May 25, 196U), p. 13.
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farm organizations, it would conflict with the anti-inflationary
policies in France.
Holland felt she had no choice but to raise her soft wheat price
for I96I4/65 to the Mansholt Plan level. Increasing costs and antici-
pation of the Mansholt Plan were the main reasons.
Boerenbond, the agricultural minister of Belgium, favored the
unification of grain prices at a level that would not lead to an ex-
pansion of production. He thought the desired harmonization of the
competitive factors in the various EEC countries had already begun. ^9
EEC Interest Groups
After the Rome Treaty establishing the Common Market came into
force, there arose many groups to promote the various sectors of agri-
culture. A cluster of pressure groups now surrounds the Common M?rket
Commission in Brussels. According to a list published by the EEC Com-
mission, there were 81 professional associations of the agricultural and
food industries in the EEC in December of 1960.5° The extent of these
lobbies is indicated in a £00 page guide-book published by the EEC Cora-
mission.
Just how effective these groups are, is of some doubt. They
have not scored many large political gains. Brussels pressure groups
must reconcile contrary national interests to arrive at a common position
T)le Welt
, June 20, 196U, p. I4.
"
Europa Land- und Emahrungswirtschaft Nachrichten . .
,
No. 109, May 29,"l9Sli, p. 1.
^°Junckerstorff, p. 38J4.
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on any major question. Thus formal decisions are likely to be diluted
by compromise. Sometimes their statements are no more than weak pro-
tests against actual decisions.
The most widely known of these interest groups is the Comite
des Organisations professionnelles agricoles (COPft.). This European
organization, which represents virtually every farming activity in the
Community, channels the views of farmers' organizations in the member
countries and promotes and represents their interests within the frame-
work of the EEC. They have played an important part in the development
of the Common Agricultural Policy as they were always consulted but their
views were often not in accordance with those of the Commission.
COPA's largest failures have resulted in the Commission's most
far reaching policy decisions. For example COPA severely criticized
the Commission's grain policy (Mansholt Plan) without noticeable effect. 5l
The European Parliament of the EEC, although it had no official
interest in setting the common grain prices, did take a stand in favor
of adopting the Mansholt Plan. They reasoned that the Council is not
only establishing a grain price, but it is establishing a part of an
overall plan for the European economy."
At the present stage of the Community's development, pressure
on national governments remains probably the most effective means for
",1Paul Lewis, "European Associations Exert Pressure in Brussels,"
European Community
,
No. 75 (October, 196b )> p. 10.
Presse- und Informationsdienst der europSischen
Gemeinschaften, Mitteilungen zur Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik
,
No. 9, January, 19bh (Brussels: Abteilung Agrarinformation
in Zusammenarbeit rait der Gnneraldirektion Landwirtschaft der
EWG Kommission), p. 3.
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farmers to exert influence on major issues. The influence of the
European pressure groups is likely to be greatly enhanced as the process
of economic integration smooths out national rivalries making it easier
for each sector of economic activity to adopt a genuine Community view-
point."
^Paul Lewis, pp. 10-11.
CHAPTER VII
PRESENT EEC ORGANIZATION OF WHEAT MARKET CONTROLS
Target Price
Wheat policies adopted by the EEC have the force of law in the
member countries according to the Rome Treaty. On July 30, 1962 the
EEC grain policies became effective. Basically until July 1, 1967
Germany retains some control over her wheat policies subject to cer-
tain EEC limitations set up in 1962.
The key to the whole system of the EEC common wheat pricing
structure is the target price. It serves as the basis for fixing the
guaranteed producer price or intervention price and the import or
threshold price. The target price is an orientation price at the
wholesale ourchasing stage for the area with the largest deficit demand
for wheat.
A target price is determined in the transition period for each
member country. For Germany this is the Duisburg area. In principle
one price is guaranteed for wheat at Duisburg and the remaining markets
build their prices accordingly. 5u Target prices are also set for rye,
5
^H. Schmidt, "Markwirtschaftliche Aspekte der Verkaufsfruchte"
(unpublished report from the Ifo - Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung,
?yfunich, n.d. ), p. 3.
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barley and corn.
Adjusted target prices in the important regional marketing
centers are determined in light of local conditions in order to cover
freight costs to move wheat from surplus areas to deficit areas. These
adjusted target prices are employed only if natural market conditions
within a country result in more than a five per cent difference between
the market prices in deficit and surplus areas. 55 in Germany there are
sixteen regional price areas applicable to 202 intervention points. 5°
In addition, ten monthly increases in the target price are provided
in order to cover the handling and storage costs for wheat.
These basic target prices for each country are reviewed each
year taking into account agricultural incomes, prices for the means
of production, wages, consumer prices and the market situation for
wheat. 57 Target prices (effective on July 1 of the coming year)
are to be set by August 1 of each prior year in order to be known
before the autumn sowing of wheat.
Intervention and threshold prices are derived from target prices
in order to maintain internal market prices at the target price level.
Thus the market price or producer price for wheat is most likely to
"l. P. Schertz, Basic Provisions of European Economic Community
drain Regulations, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural
Service, M - 1U7 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, June,
1963), p. 3.
"Sicco Mansholt Speaks on the Common Market," p. 7.
European Economic Community Commission, Common Grain Price
,
November, 1963, p. li.
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fluctuate around the target price within a range according to the supply
and demand for wheat,-58
For the 1962/63 marketing year, the EEC Council decided that the
target prices of member countries were to be set within prescribed limits.
The German wheat price in the largest deficit area was taken as the ceiling
price and the French price in the largest surplus area as the floor
price. ^9 During the transitional period or until July 1, 1967 the
individual national governments are to determine their own national
target prices. These limits were set in order to avoid any increase
in the price differential between member countries.
In I963/6I1, these limits were shortened by increasing the minimum
price. Also the use of the EEC quality standards in place of German
standards for grain meant a slight indirect lowering of the wheat price
in Germany. Starting no later than July 1, 1967 there will be but one
target price for the entire Common Market and adjusted target prices
will be keyed from it.
Intervention Price
Tied to the target prices are intervention prices. In effect
they are supDort prices at the wholesale level closest to the producers.
For this reason they have a significant influence on farm returns.
go
Junckerstorff, p. 3Ui.
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In order to guarantee that the market price received by producers
will be as close as possible to the target price and one which at the
same time will provide for variations in the local market prices, the
Import and Storage Agencies make intervention purchases. These are
made throughout the year whenever the market price for what drops below
the intervention price. In this manner the market is stabilized.
The intervention prices are equal to the target prices reduced by a
fixed percentage determined by the EEC between a minimum of five per
cent and a maximum of ten per cent.
The marketing agencies are required to purchase all quantities
of wheat offered at the intervention prices. Stocks thus accumulated
by the intervention agencies may be later sold in the domestic markets
at the target price level and in export markets at world price levels.
Accumulated supplies of wheat and rye may be denaturized and sold in
domestic markets. Denaturization of privately held stocks of wheat and
rye may also be encouraged by government payments. ^ Denaturization
is the treatment of these grains so that they are unfit for human con-
sumption. They must be then sold at a lower price as feed grains, 6*
60
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European Economic Community Commission, "Financing of the
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memo, Brussels, February, 1961, p. 2.
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Threshold Price
Threshold prices are a vital part of the EEC wheat pricing
structure. The threshold price or import price is the equivalent to
the target price less freight costs between the point of entry into
the country and the marketing area. These prices are used to calcu-
late the levies on imports which give protection to the internal target
and intervention prices. Until July 1, 196? these are set by the member
countries within EEC limits.
The threshold prices in the local inland markets will be chiefly
determined according to market location. The actual upper price limit
for domestic wheat is the threshold price of imported wheat. The Import
and Storage Agencies are required to place on the market any stocks of
wheat it has when the local market price for wheat reaches the threshold
orice.
The EEC variable import levy system, which on July 30, 1962,
replaced the old duties and quantitative measures of protection in
Germany, is intended to ensure that farmers do not have to face compe-
tition of wheat from third countries at less than the target price.
During the transitional period for the case of imports from other
member countries, the levies will cover the difference between the
wheat price in the exporting area and the national threshold price in
the importing country. There ia a fixed sum subtracted from the levy
63
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to ensure EEC exporting countries a margin of preference over ex-
porters of wheat from third countries. ^ In Germany, this was four
Deutsche Mark per ton in 1962/63.
Levies on imports from non-member countries will be equal to the
difference between the lowest c.i.f. price on the world market and the
threshold price in the importing member country. These levies so
assessed by the individual member countries are deposited in the Com-
mon Market Guidance and Guarantee Fund which is broken down into a
Wheat Market Stabilization Fund and a Feed Grain Market Stabilization
Fund. 6*
In order that the proposed system of variable import levies may
operate effectively and in accordance with changing world market prices,
import and exDort licneses are issued by EEC member countries for all
imports and exports of grain and grain products. °° These have so far
been issued without restrictions. IraDort quotas are also authorized
by the EEC. An escape clause leaves it open to member countries to
suspend import quotas if their farmers are threatened by a flood of
imported wheat.
Franco-frontier prices are free-on-border prices. They apply to
wheat available for export by member countries and are parallel to the
c.i.f. prices of third countries. During the transitional period they
^Michael Schanks, p. 90.
Leo J. Schaben, p. 29.
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are used in figuring the levies on wheat for intra-community trade. '
Export Subsidies
EEC member countries are permitted to subsidize exports of wheat
to third countries (non-member countries). During the transitional period
subsidies on exports to other member countries -will also be permitted.
They will be calculated in relation to the threshold price. These
export rebates by the EEC enable member governments and later the
Community authorities, to help farmers to dispose of their surpluses
6R
of wheat on the world market.
Financing of these subsidies from the Guidance and Guarantee
Fund of the EEC is discussed in the next section of this report. Sub-
sidies for export to third countries may be in the form of a cash sub-
sidy or an authorization to import quantities of other grains free from
import levies. In addition to direct export subsidies, member countries
are authorized to pay a freight export subsidy of up to 32 DM per ton
69
which is important to the flour exports of Germany.
Guidance and Guarantee Fund
In 1962 the EEC provided for the establishment of a European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund to finance the Community's
67L. p . Schertz, p. 12.
lichael Schanks, p. 91.
69
Karen J. Friedmann, p. 66,
Common Agricultural Policy. The fund is a part of the Community
budget and the appropriations are approved by the Council with the
annual estimates. It is set up to operate in the nature of a compen-
sation or clearing fund.
The guarantee section of the fund is concerned with reimbure-
ments for member countries' expenditures on export refunds in trade
with non-member countries and expenses incurred in intervening in
the domestic market. During the transitional period, refunds for
intra-raember wheat trade are also covered. For the grains sector
the losses resulting from denaturing cereal grains and then selling
them below the target prices will also be covered. Expenditures
incurred in stockpiling grains or carrying stocks from one marketing
year to the next are included. 70
The guidance section is concerned with expenditures for com-
mon action to increase the productivity of agriculture by promot-
ing technical progress, rational development of output and optimum
use of the factors of production, in particular manpower, These
include long term structural changes made necessary by the develop-
ment of the Common Market. It is planned that expenditures in this
section shall be only one-third as large as expenditures in the
guarantee section.
70
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Technical advice on the implementation of the guidance sec-
tion will be provided to the Commission by a permanent committee on
agricultural structures. The fund may subsidize up to 25 per cent
of the project costs. Groups that will ultimately benefit from the
improvement must contribute at least 30 per cent of the project cost
while the member countries on whose territory the project is located
must also participate. '-*-
During the transition period use of both sections of the
Guidance and Guarantee Fund has been limited. The guarantee section
contributed only one-sixth of the expenses of the member countries
for export refunds and action on the market for the first year of
operation (1962/63). In each of the following two years this share
increased by one-sixth. By the end of 1969, it is planned that all
such expenditures will be entirely financed by the fund.
Compensatory payments for German, Italian and Luxembourg
farmers, who will suffer losses of farm income due to the intro-
duction of the common grain prices, will be financed from a special
guidance fund. Contributions to this fund are made by all member
countries on the basis of the scale for general budgetary contri-
butions. '
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Receipts for the entire Guidance and Guarantee Fund during the
first three years of operation (1962/63 to lQ6h/65) are made up of
financial contributions from the member countries. One part of these
contributions is computed according to the general budget scale of the
EEC Treaty (France, Germany, and Italy 28 per cent each, Belgium and the
Netherlands 7.9 per cent each and Luxembourg 0.2 per cent). The second
part is proportional to the value of each member country's net imports
from non-member countries. The EEC Council also fixed a ceiling for
the per cent contribution from each member country during the first
three years. For Germany this was set at 31 per cent.
Possible elimination of the budgetary contributions could place
the burden of the future expense of the fund on the importing countries
—
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. They would have to pay more than
would be required by the general budget scale because they have relatively
the highest net imports from non-member countries.^
Two major policy questions remain undecided regarding financial
regulations of the Common Agricultural Policy. The fir3t concerns the
share of expenditures on subsidies and interventions that the fund must
bear between the I96I1/6!? marketing season and the end of the transition
period in 1970. The second concerns the sources of the fund's financing
during the same period and beyond 1970. Both are very important to
Germany. A host of unanswered questions complicates the matter. Some
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of these are costs of compensatory payments to German farmers and
costs of export subsidies and interventions on the domestic markets.
Also receipts from the variable import levies can vary considerably.
CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGING WHEAT PRODUCTION SITUATION
IN GERMNY
Imported Wheat Situation
In order to produce good bread and wheat products, which meet
European consumer demand, a certain quantity of high protein wheat with
good baking qualities has to be mixed with the common soft wheat pro-
duced in Germany. Most of this quality wheat must be imported in Germany.
The entire EEC area imports an estimated 2.5 million tons of quality
wheat in a normal harvest year. It will probably remain at this level
for several year3.^ Germany imports about 800,000 to 900,000 tons of
quality wheat per year. ^5
Since 1962 the import price of wheat in Germany has been based
on the target price at the wholesale level rather than the producer
price level as previously used. This resulted in higher import fees
and an increase in the price of imported quality wheat to the millers.
Under the EEC marketing system it was intended that imported
wheat should bear the full cost of freight from the North Sea ports of
7)
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Germany to the areas where it is used. Thus the import price would
increase in a general north to south direction. '" The end result is
that the higher price of imported wheat would replace the previous com-
pulsory mixing requirements of millers. Millers would be forced due to
economic reasons to use the maximum amount possible of the cheaper
domestic wheat.
In effect what hapoened was a prospect of increasing flour prices.
To avoid this price increase for flour, the German government used a
provision of the EEC grain regulation which permitted a subsidy for the
benefit of consumers. In 1963 and 196U subsidies ranging from 2\\ to
26.80 DM per ton for imported wheat were granted to grain millers. This
tended to neutralize some of the increase in the price of imported
wheat. '• In Germany during 1962/63 the first year for higher priced
imported quality wheat prices, there was still a large demand for
quality wheat.
Domestic Wheat Situation
The EEC regulations, which went into effect in 1962, have not
changed the domestic wheat production situation in Germany. Due to the
uncertainty of future price relationships, farmers have avoided most
production changes. Now that it has been decided to lower the target
price for wheat starting on July 1, 1967 there are several production
changes that may occur at that time.
7
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wOne important possibility exists to change the supply side of
wheat in Germany. This would be to increase the reduction of quality
wheat needed for milling purposes. As mentioned before, Germany needs
around 800,000 to 900,000 tons per year. A sizeable portion of this
probably can be produced in Germany although production of high quality
milling wheat is limited by the land and climatic conditions.
There is a strong price incentive for quality wheat in most of
Germany since the threshold price for imported wheat is above the target
price for soft wheat. When the price of soft wheat drops in 1967, the
price advantage for quality wheat production will become even more im-
portant. Although the threshold price will also drop in 1967, the fact
that it is higher than the target price means that by switching to
quality wheat production, some farmers may avoid part of the target
price decline.
Since 1959 quality premiums have been paid by the government for
domestic wheat rich in gluten and of good bread making quality. '° The
basis of the program is the payment of subsidies for the planting of
quality wheat varieties. These subsidies are used to help cover ex-
penses for items like certified seed, fertilizer, and quality tests
(including sedimentation test). In I963 the program involved 200,000
acres or seven per cent of the wheat production area. '9
'^Organization for European Economic Cooperation, p; 163.
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It is the view of the German Minister of Agriculture Schwarz
that a large part of Germany's demand for quality wheat can be covered
with domestic production. Since 1961 the Ministry of Agriculture has
promoted the development of the new varieties of high baking quality
wheat.
Production of quality wheat by only one or two farmers in an
area has no purpose. Good, uniform seed must be provided to a number
of farmers in several close lying districts with favorable growing con-
ditions. Only a large group of farmers in one area can ask for and re-
ceive premiums for the production of quality wheat. °
Supply contracts have been recommended for this type of wheat
production. It has been proposed that at least 100 tons (3,667 bushels)
of quality wheat should be offered from a single area. Funds from the
"Green Plan" can be used for the establishment and development of
associations of growers for the production and delivery of quality
wheat.
Production of quality wheat is receiving interest from several
groups. Fertiliser companies point out the price advantages of quality
wheat along with increased fertilizer application. Farm organizations
like the German Agricultural Society have stressed the development of
new wheat varieties with increased baking quality.
How far production of high baking quality wheat can be expanded
is difficult to say. Thus far most production has been limited. If
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problems of adaptability are overcome this could have a serious impact
on future wheat imports by Germany.
Another possibility that may occur in the future is the substi-
tution of feed grain : roduction for wheat production. In recent years
there has been a shortage of feed grains. The increasing emphasis
being placed on livestock enterprises in certain areas of Germany will
no doubt bring about an enlarged market for feed grains.
The rules and regulations for implementing the first phase of the
Common Agricultural Policy, which became effective on July 30, 1962,
included wheat. The EEC target and intervention prices now used in
Germany are similar to the maximum-minimum prices for wheat provided
by the 19^0 grain marketing laws. The difference between them is that
the EEC prices are wholesale while the previous ones were producer
prices. Actually this change has had little effect on German domestic
wheat prices as given in table I.
The utilization of common grain prices on July 1, 1967 will mean
the full establishment of a common wheat policy three years ahead of
the schedule provided in the Rome Treaty. In Germany the utilization
of the common grain prices will cause a 10.6 per cent drop in the target
price for wheat from U70.6O DM per ton to U25.00 DM per ton. 1
Under the previous system the high and low price limits for wheat
were established and kept uniform for four large areas in Germany.
Regional price differences were leveled out by the use of freight sub-
sidies. The result was a fairly stable producer price. The EEC system
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is designed to allow for a modest response of the wheat price to economic
forces. A greater regional price differentiation is now allowed by the
sixteen regional target price areas. In a local area the domestic
producer price for wheat can now vary between the upper limit of the
threshold price of 1m orted wheat and the intervention price. The local
supply and demand situation will determine the actual price level. The
monthly increases in the target price are much the same as those before
1962.
The greater regional price differentiation of the EEC marketing
system means that the intervention price for wheat in distant surplus
areas can be below the previous average producer price of that area.
There is a provision in the EEC policies whereby the difference between
the target and intervention prices of the farthest markets from the
deficit area of Duisburg may be reduced to one-half that of Duisburg.
Thus, for example, while in Duisburg the intervention price is seven
per cent under the target price, it has been reduced during the transi-
tional period to 3.5 per cent at the surplus area of Passau. All other
markets can reduce this difference by an amount corresponding to their
distance from Duisburg. 82 The range of price movements of distant surplus
areas is thereby considerably reduced from that of the deficit areas.
Another result will be that through timely sales of wheat, local
farmers will have the opportunity to influence the local market prices
in some areas. After the massive sales following harvest there will be
the possibility of higher prices later in the year due to weak sales of
82
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wheat. Thus after accounting for storage costs it may be possible for
producers to receive a price higher than the intervention price by
holding their wheat for later sale.
The nroblem of an unfavorable producer price for wheat has also
been helped by changing the railroad freight rates for wheat. In 1963
Germany reduced her freight rates by 25 per cent. At the same time a
general freight subsidy of 2$ per cent for collective grain shipments
was started. These exceptions to the EEC aim of removing freight sub-
sidies were allowed during the transition period in order to ease the
adjustments. These aids apply to both domestic and imported wheat. In
this manner Germany was able to reduce the railroad freight rate for
wheat to about hi per cent that of other means of transportation. ^3
All of the above measures help to reduce the regional price dif-
ferences for wheat. The EEC pricing system was designed to introduce a
greater and more realistic regional price differentiation for wheat.
Thus Germany has been trying to go back to the old method of fairly
uniform wheat prices. What future changes will bring is uncertain.
Certain differences have appeared in the manner in which inter-
vention purchases are being carried out in Germany under the EEC regu-
lations which came into effect in 1962. Previously intervention purchases
of wheat were carried out by the Import and Storage Agencies only when
farmers were unable to obtain the minimum price. Now the Import and
Storage Agencies are required under EEC regulations to purchase all
wheat that is offered for sale at the intervention price and may also
Ibid., pp. h-S.
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make voluntary purchases above the intervention price. It is a stronger
regulated process but the final result of market stabilization has not
changed.
At the import points in Germany there have been changes not only
in the method of controlling im orts but also in policy aims. Previously
imports were strictly regulated by quotas, licenses, and other restrictions.
The Import and Storage Agencies could then determine the price and quantity
of certain qualities of wheat that would be allowed into specific areas.
They had the power in their hands to carry out desired wheat policies.
Since 1962 the EEC marketing system has relied mainly on the variable
import levy. The desired aim now is to place imported wheat on a com-
petitive basis with domestic production. 01*
The role of the German Import and Storage Agencies as a state
trader has been eliminated. Gone also are customs duties, quantitative
import restrictions, and milling quotas. Grain quotas in bilateral agree-
ments between Germany and exporting countries have lost their meaning.
Germany still has the right to denature wheat for feed use but up to
the present 3he has not made use of this EEC provision.
3
->
Compensatory Measures
In view of the probable effects of a price decrease for grains
in Germany, it was clear that for the sake of balanced development in
*>11 economic sectors in the community, there had to be action taken to
%bid., pp. 1-2.
°^Karen J. Eriedmann, p. 72.
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compensate fanners whose incomes would decrease. The Commission decided
on special compensatory payments to German, Italian, and Luxembourg
farmers during the transition period to offset these losses of income.
This calculation took into account the fact that changes in prices for
coarse grain bring about resultant changes in income from pigs,
and poultry. °°
The losses in income to German agriculture as a whole that will
result from the lower grain prices are difficult to predict with scien-
tific exactness. These compensatory payments will be made over the three
seasons 19&7 to 1970 and will be phased out by the end of the period.
At that time they will be replaced by measures of assistance in the
form of "Community Plana" for the benefit of all farmers in all member
countries.
The Community will now pay Germany $280 million, Italy $130
million, and Luxembourg #2 1/2 million in compensatory payments. All
six member countries will contribute to a special guidance fund for these
compensatory payments. °7 This amount is far short of what the German
government had requested. The original version of the Mansholt Plan
had called for a compensatory payment of $lltO million to Germany for the
year 196b/65 and a decreasing amount each year thereafter until 1970.
These compensatory measures can take the following forms: Direct
payments to farms whose incomes are reduced by the reduction of grain
European Economic Community Commission, Common Grain Price, p. 7.
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prices, contributions to improved social benefits available to farmers,
aids granted to improve productivity and to rationalize farms, and aids
granted to producers of durum wheat. as
From the European Guidance and Guarantee Fund, German "Wheat
producers are receiving and will receive more benefits and aids planned
for the agriculture of the Common Market as a whole. The first imple-
menting regulations for the Fund became effective on July 1, 1961i. Under
the guidance section, 1^0 requests for 30 million had been sent to the
Commission by July but only between eight and nine million dollars were
made available for these first requests. Germany requested assistance
for water schemes and marketing. 8
°
From July 196? to July 196b the expenditures of the guarantee
section for export subsidies and market support totaled $77 million.
According to the EEC rules only a small part of the national farm
policy expenditures could as yet be recouped from the Fund. Germany
ended up contributing $18 million more than she received while France
received the bulk of the benefits. 90
Last December the Council also decided that from the entry into
force of the common cereal prices, market intervention and export re-
funds for cereals will be entirely financed by the Community. All other
expenditures of the Fund will be financed entirely by the end of 1969.
88European Economic Community Commission, Common Grain Price , p. 7.
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It is estimated that from 1967 onwards the Guidance and Guarantee Fund
will have to provide one billion dollars each year for the support of
91
agricultural prices, export promotion, and structural improvement.
As mentioned earlier the German government is committed by law
to take no measures that would reduce farm incomes. Application of EEC
regulations has brought to an end some forms of aid used by the German
government for wheat producers. Also a great loss of income will re-
sult from the common grain price. The German government is obligated
to counteract these losses with other protective measures. Thus Germany
is exchanging one form of protection for another. °*
The following pledge of the German government is found in a 196£
article by the Ministry of Agriculture, "The federal government will
endeavor to compensate the income losses which will result from the
lowering of the German grain price level, n7J
The main present day root problem of German agriculture may be
considered one of structural deficiencies (small farm units and scat-
tered holdings). It is to be expected then that most of the $610 mil-
lion of 196b "Green Plan" funds went to improve the structure of agri-
culture, working and living conditions, and cheapened credit. In 196k
a total of 290,000 hectares was encompassed as part of a continuing land
redistribution and consolidation program, l600 farmsteads were relocated
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from the cramped villages to the country, and 13,000 kilometers of hard
surfaced roads were built in rural areas. 9u in the long run all these
measures will improve the income earning capacity of German farmers and
help them to offset the losses suffered from the EEC common grain prices.
In the future there may be more tax reductions for farmers such
as the removal of the sales tax at the producer level in 1956 which
saved farmers millions of dollars. Increased retirement benefits and
other social oayraents are also likely to come up for future consideration.
Increased aids and subsidies, such as the saving in diesel fuel costs^
quality wheat bonuses, and other measures, offer another possibility.
"The transition which is now in full swing within individual
farms as well as in the general agricultural and marketing structures
must keep in view the dynamic situation of the Common Market and be
carried out in unison with the decisions of all the members of the
EEC. "95 To accomplishthis, it is the goal of the German government to
provide governmental assistance where it is needed to alleviate the ac-
companying hardships to farmers during this transition.
One of the constant problems in the development of the Common
Market has been the sharing of costs and benefits. Naturally no country
likes to incur losses that result in benefits to another. Since Germany
will suffer the most severe losses of income due to the application of
the common wheat and grain prices, she has sought to recoup adequate
compensation from the EEC.
9l*Ibid
., pp. 12-16.
9?Ibid., p. 5.
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The skinning charges from the variable import levies on wheat
now go into the Guidance and Guarantee Fund and not into the German
treasury. France has received the majority of the export subsidies
for wheat. The $18 million negative balance incurred by Germany in
1962 to 196h was not too pleasing. Also the compensatory payments,
which Germany will receive in 1967 to 1970, are seen by many Germans
as inadequate to replace the expected income losses resulting from the
common grain prices.
Structural Changes
One of the basic aims of the founding of the Common Market is to
promote the production of a good or commodity in the most favorable
location. This was again brought into the objectives of the Common
Agricultural Policy by encouraging efficient and rational production
in agriculture. What does this mean for German wheat production? For
the high priced, sometimes inefficient wheat production in Germany, it
means that in some places it should be dropped for other more rational
agricultural enterprises and additional wheat should be imported from
the more efficient wheat producers in the Common Market or in non-
member countries.
This is a hard decision for anyone to accept and the German farmers
are no exception. The prospects are that changes will be slow in coming.
According to a U. S. Department of Agriculture report, some production
adjustment will undoubtedly occur, especially in the long run, due to
the decrease in grain prices on July 1, 1967. Some farmers are likely
to switch from wheat to other farm enterprises. However some farmers
57
are likely to leave farming and find other employment. 9°
According to the views of the EEC Commission, "German grain
production, at least during the first years the single grain price is
applied, is not expected to vary from past years.'1 ''' An American esti-
mate is that a price decline of 10 to 25 per cent in Germany would bring
a response of stabilization of wheat output. 9°
Currently in some areas in Germany less emphasis is being placed
on wheat production. An example is the case of farms in areas that are
some distance from the centers of grain consumption or areas that are
partially isolated such as those found along the border with East Germany.
Use of the EEC pricing system with its greater regional price dif-
ferentiation has meant slightly lower producer prices for wheat in
these areas. It is now advantageous for some of there to rearrange
their production programs and produce animal products with their
relatively cheap wheat or to substitute feed ;>rain production in place
of wheat. Increased animal production and feed grain production in
areas with suitable grassland conditions are being advocated by ad-
visory groups.
In certain areas of southern Germany increased feed grain pro-
duction is not the best answer. In Bavaria in recent years not all the
96 TJU. S. Department of Agriculture, The 1965 Western Europe
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production of fat cattle could be marketed locally and some had to be
sold in the Rhein River and Ruhr areas.^ Limited opportunities exist
in some areas for increased production of vegetable crops, poultry and
other products which can take up some of the losses created by lower
wheat prices. The many changes to wheat production and the entire
farming structure in Germany that are now taking place and will result
from the future decline in the wheat price pose many complex problems.
These can only be worked out over a long period so the final results
will not be kno*n for years.
In early 196l the German Minister of Agriculture Schwarz and
Vice-President of the EEC Commission, Mansholt appointed a research
committee to prepare a scientific opinion on the effects on the income
position of German fanners as a result of the sinking of the grain
prices in the Mansholt Plan. The committee was composed of eight
professors primarily from German universities.
The committee reasoned that the equalization of the grain prices
should be the first step in the harmonization of all agricultural prices
in the EEC. They worked with a Lb per cent graduated drop in the price
of wheat until 1970 and thought this would cause a decline in the average
general price level of all agricultural products in Germany.
Their results were that it would be 1970 before total farm
income would regain the levels of 1958/59. Also the number of people
employed in Agriculture would drop from 2.6 million in 1958/59 to
H. Schmidt, p. 20.
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between 1.75 and 1.85 million in 1970 and to between 1.55 and 1.75
million in 1975. 10°
This predicted drop in workers employed in agriculture is but a
continuation of the present trend. Reports such as this present facts
that draw strong comments from farmers. These are the results that many-
people knew would happen.
In the establishment of a customs union such as the EEC, there is
one basic fundamental underlying the process. This is the transfer
of the traditional national means of influencing intra-group trade and
external trade to the supranational governing bodies. Hans von der
Groeben summed it up in a speech when he stated, "The six closed national
economies are giving way to six national economies open to each other
and subject in their mutual relations to a new, common and superimposed
economic system to which the national economic systems must to this
estent adapt themselves."
German wheat production must now adapt itself to the EEC trade
policies and price levels. Although Germany objected loudly and longly
to the decrease in the wheat price, they have now accepted it and must
proceed towards integration of their agriculture into the EEC. Now the
previous protective efforts of the German government are being shifted
1
^"Wirkungen einer Senkung der Agrarpreise," Oemeinsames
Gutachten von Mitglieden des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim BML und
von wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Beratern der Kommission der EWQ,
Brussels, June, 1962, p. 19.
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towards assistance to farmers in this process of integration into the
EEC economy. The EEC is now taking over from Germany the responsibility
for guaranteeing a reasonable level of income for efficient wheat pro-
ducers.
On German insistence in April 196u, the grain price agreement
agreed upon by the EEC in December 1961a, contains a revision clause.
It states that before July 1, 1966 the Ministerial Council will inves-
tigate whether changed economic conditions (notably inflationary price
rises, increasing costs, and other intervening developments) necessitate
a change in the agreed cereals price which will come into effect on
July 1, 1967.
This reflects the German demand to tie the grain price to the
cost of living index or general price index, which was not acceptable
to the Council. It is hoped by the Germans that changing conditions
will warrant an increase in the price of wheat. This chance of revision
makes it difficult for the EEC to offer a firm basis for negotiations
in the Kennedy Round.
The past few years have created some grave problems for the long
range planning of farmers in the agricultural sector in Germany. Not
knowing definitely when and bow much the wheat price and returns from
other commodities would change, was a handicap in making investment
decisions. It has been hard for the individual farmer to know which
enterprises to emphasize. Now that the price levels for grains have
''"Success in Agriculture: A New Stimulus," Common Market,
Vol. 5, No. 2 (February, 1965), p. 31.
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been set, they can proceed in their planning with some degree of certainty.
The acceptance of the Mansholt Plan did give the Common Market a
reasonable basis for its foreign policy in the GATT negotiations. In
spite of the revision clause, the EEC now has something more than a
proposal to work with.
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The EEC's agreement on common prices for grains marks the first
time that a group of nations have combined their national agricultural
policies under a common price system. The price of wheat holds a key
position in the pricing structure of West German agriculture. Wheat
production in Germany requires the most complete and complicated system
of market management. A highly protective and subsidized agriculture
now surrounds the German wheat producer.
The aoplication of the EEC common grain prices on July 1, 1967
will mean a lower wheat price for Germany and will bring about related
chanpes and problems. This report analyzes what these changes may be
in reference to the structure and aims of both Germany and the Common
Market and the views of various interest groups.
iVest Germany is relinquishing her national control of wheat
policies to the supranational organization of the Common Market.
Acceptance of the Mansholt Plan by Germany in December of I96I4 was
preceded by German objections to financing of the Common Agricultural
Policy, adequacy of the EEC compensatory payments, and differences among
EEC member countries on freight and labor costs and tax and trade policies.
Probably the most highly organized sector of the German economy
is agriculture. The agricultural block or "Green Front" is often en-
gaped in politics and has a strong voice in government. All the farm
groups have tried to present the plight of the cost price squeeze of
German wheat producers.
Most non-farm interest groups in Germany wanted to see the com-
mon price levels established as soon as possible and not too high. The
influence of European pressure groups is not very strong presently but
2it is likely to be enhanced as the process of economic integration
proceeds.
The EEC regulations, which went into effect in 1962, have not
changed the domestic wheat production situation in Germany. The price
decrease for wheat in 1967 may cause an increasing interest in production
of quality milling wheat. Another possible change is the substitution
of feed grain production for wheat production. Increased animal pro-
duction is also being advocated for certain areas.
The main present day root problem of German agriculture may be
considered one of structural deficiencies. As part of the German govern-
ment's pledge to compensate the income losses of farmers, which will re-
sult from the lowering of the grain price level, the government hopes
at the same time to alleviate the structural problems of small farms
with scattered holdings. In the long run the German government hopes
to improve the income earning capacity of the German farmers and help
to alleviate the hardships which farmers will encounter during the
remainder of the EEC transition period.
